Wirecard: the biggest financial scandal in Germany

Wirecard: the biggest financial scandal in Germany

Matthieu MENAGER

In this article, Matthieu MENAGER (ESSEC Business School, Global Bachelor in Business Administration (GBBA), 2017-2021) looks back at the Wirecard case, one of the biggest financial scandal in Germany.

Wirecard: what exactly is it?

The Wirecard affair is one of the biggest financial scandals in Germany. Wirecard is a financial start-up founded in 1999 by Markus Braun (an Austrian with a background in computer engineering). This fintech is a German payment and financial services platform. Its first customers were pornography and online betting sites. But little by little, and thanks to the expansion of online sales in the 2000s, Wirecard established itself with airlines, travel agencies, online pharmacies, etc. It was in 2008, unlike traditional banks (2007-2008: the sub-prime crisis) that the company experienced a major boom. In 2010, Jan Marsalek (a very important member of Wirecard) officially became Wirecard’s Chief Operating Officer (COO). His arrival will have a significant impact on the scandal (L’Express, 2022).

The decline

In 2018, Wirecard joined the DAX 30 index (the German equivalent of the CAC 40 index), knocking Commerzbank off the ranking (the second-largest bank in Germany). Between 2016 and 2018, Wirecard’s turnover doubled from €1 billion to €2 billion. At the beginning of 2019, the company had a market capitalisation of €17 billion, comparable to that of Deutsche Bank (Germany’s leading bank), but with fifteen times fewer employees and less turnover. Markus Braun, who held 7% of the shares, was a billionaire at the time. In January 2019, an investigation by the Financial Times (the British financial daily) revealed a number of abuses by Wirecard. According to the newspaper, its managers in Asia had written false contracts and worked on financial manipulations. In November 2019, Ernst & Young (one of the world’s top 4 audit firms) refused to certify the 2017 accounts. In the meantime, it had seen nothing but fire. This crisis has even reached the supervisory authority, which lacks the resources and has not done its job. As a result, supervision has been withdrawn from it in favour of another organisation, the BaFin (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, better known by its abbreviation BaFin, is Germany’s financial regulatory authority). In June 2020 everything accelerates:

  • Mid-June: Wirecard repeatedly postpones the publication of its annual results (an investigation has been launched into suspicions of stock price manipulation)
  • 19 June: Markus Braun resigns
  • 21 June: the company confirms that the €1.9 billion mentioned in its balance sheet (i.e. a quarter of the size of the balance sheet) “most probably does not exist”.
  • 23 June: Markus Braun is arrested by the authorities, then released on €5 million bail.
  • 25 June: The company lost 98% of its value on the stock market, declared itself bankrupt and filed for bankruptcy (Its bank creditors expect to lose 80% of the money lent to Wirecard, according to an estimate by the Wall Street Journal).

Figure 1. The Wirecard’s Share Price.
Wirecard share price
Source: Boursorama

Figure 1 shows Wirecard’s share price with its entry on the DAX 30 in September 2018. In June 2020, we see the complete decline and the loss of around 98% of its value.

The investigation eventually revealed that Wirecard’s accounts for the years 2015 to 2018 had embellished the situation, in order to make the company attractive to investors. Some of the commissions based on payments did not come from Wirecard but from so-called third parties in Asia and the Gulf region who had a licence to operate. However, “there were in reality no resellers connected by these partners” and therefore no tangible turnover, according to the indictment. The business lawyer Mark Tolentino, presented by the German press as the person who operated as a fiduciary agent on behalf of Wirecard, is a key figure in the case. He claimed to be the victim of identity theft (the sums deposited in the accounts he opened were “just enough to buy an iPhone”).

January 2024, the trial is still ongoing and continues to raise questions about the truth (Euromaidan, 2023). It will probably take a few more months to reach a definitive conclusion. Markus Braun is still in prison and awaiting the end of his trial. Jan Marsalek is still missing. The day after the revelations, he left on a private jet from a small Austrian airport for Belarus. He faces a much longer sentence than the others. The investigators discovered that Jan Marsalek was part crook, part spy for Russia. He was apparently very close to the Kremlin (which also helped him to escape). He had a number of interactions with important figures, including Nicolas Sarkozy (they had lunch together). Neither the German authorities nor Interpol have managed to arrest him. He is now believed to be in Moscow under a false identity, protected by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). He remains Europe’s most wanted man.

The impact of the scandal on Germany

Wirecard had taken on considerable importance in the lives of German citizens. Its companies manage payments via mobile applications or marketplaces, speed up the granting of credit, facilitate the sending of currency between countries and help companies manage their spending. It is a veritable economic infrastructure, in the same way as energy, water or transport networks. It involves the most delicate thing of all: money. All stakeholders must draw conclusions from the Wirecard scandal, including companies, shareholders, regulators and even customers:

  • Start-ups now have two options for operating their services: obtain a payment institution licence, which is time-consuming and costly, or go through intermediaries who offer turnkey payment services.
  • Shareholders and financial regulators will be stepping up their supervision.
  • Customers will pay more attention to the products they use.

The government also has its share of responsibility in the affair. The German financial market supervisor (BaFin) is under the authority of the Ministry of Finance (formerly headed by Olaf Scholz, who is currently Germany’s Chancellor). Since the affair, Olaf Scholz has announced a reform of the BaFin to give it more power. However, the minister himself was implicated in the scandal: a document from his own ministry states that Olaf Scholz knew that “BaFin was investigating in all directions” Wirecard as early as February 2019. The radical left-wing party Die Linke was outraged: “Negligence in the control of companies worth billions is totally unimaginable”. Chancellor Angela Merkel herself promoted the company during a trip to China in 2019, even though her services (but not herself, according to her circle) were already aware of the existence of an investigation, reports (Le Monde, 2020).

Why should I be interested in this post?

This case is very interesting in terms of the impact it has had on the development of the various authorities in Germany, Europe and the world. Just like the subprime crisis in 2008, the Kerviel affair in 2008, the carbon tax scam between 2008 and 2009, or the CumEx files in 2018, the Wirecard scandal has seen its share of fraud and manipulation. These various scandals show that today’s financial system is still not perfect, and that it must constantly be improved and made more secure to avoid a crash in the national or even global economy. These frauds are also causing a huge chasm in the national economy, which cumulatively is proving to be very significant. Although we cannot yet quantify precisely the impact of the Wirecard scandal on German GDP, we can see that the crises mentioned above (among others) are more than alarming: The CO2 emission allowance scam deprived the French tax authorities of a total of €1.6 billion in revenue, according to the Cour des Comptes. Losses estimated at €5 billion, according to Europol. The fraud perpetrated by the former Société Générale dealing room trader Jérome Kerviel resulted in a loss of €4.9 billion between 2005 and early 2008. The level of losses following the subprime crisis is close to $400 billion or even $500 billion. So, it’s important to be aware of the various mistakes we may have made and to avoid repeating them. I’d also like to take this opportunity to make a transition to the next case I’m going to look at: CumEx files.

N.B.: To find out more about the Wirecard case, you can watch the documentary “Skandal!” or the scripted series “King of Stonks” on Netflix.

Related posts on the SimTrade blog

   ▶ Louis DETALLE Wirecard: At the heart of the biggest German financial scandal of the 21st century

   ▶ Nithisha CHALLA The DAX 30 index

Useful resources

Wirecard

France 24 (08/12/2022) Wirecard : le scandale financier qui a secoué l’Allemagne arrive devant la justice

Forbes (17/07/2020) Le Scandale Wirecard Ou La Fintech Au Révélateur

RTL (30/06/2020) Wirecard : tout comprendre au scandale financier qui ébranle l’Allemagne

La Tribune (25/07/2020) Scandale Wirecard : la gigantesque fraude de la fintech expliquée en 5 points

Le Monde (31/08/2022) Comprendre l’affaire Wirecard, le scandale financier qui secoue l’Allemagne depuis juin

20 Minutes (19/06/2020) Allemagne : Le scandale Wirecard coûte sa place au patron fondateur Markus Braun

Euromaidan (16/12/2023) WSJ : Wirecard fraudster CEO was Russian agent for nearly a decade

L’Express (08/12/2022) Fraude Wirecard : comment le sulfureux Jan Marsalek est devenu l’homme le plus recherché d’Europe

About the author

The article was written in February 2024 by Matthieu MENAGER (ESSEC Business School, Global Bachelor in Business Administration (GBBA), 2017-2021)

The incredible story of Nick Leeson & the Barings Bank

The incredible story of Nick Leeson & the Barings Bank

Louis DETALLE

In this article, Louis DETALLE (ESSEC Business School, Grande Ecole Program – Master in Management, 2020-2023) looks back at the bank fraud of Nick Leeson, a trader at Barings, which led to the collapse of the UK’s oldest investment bank…

History of Barings and Nick Leeson’s background

Barings was founded in 1762 in the UK, making it the oldest British bank, so renowned and prestigious that even the Queen of England was a client. It is therefore in this renowned institution that Nick Leeson will pursue his career after a spell at Morgan Stanley as an operations assistant. Ambitious and ready to do anything to make a name for himself within this prestigious institution, Nick Leeson multiplies risky operations and gradually climbs the ladder, greeted by a management admiring his results considering his young age.

The great fraud

In 1990, Barings chose Nick Leeson to head up the management of its Singapore subsidiary. Having spotted a flaw in the system for monitoring the compliance of traders’ market operations, Nick Leeson carried out speculative operations that were normally unauthorised and that brought in a lot of money for Barings. Nick Leeson was therefore engaged in a series of successful speculative trades, which is why management did not look into the matter. However, the day comes when the trader’s luck runs out: he makes bigger and bigger losses, as he hopes to make up for previous losses with each new trade.

With the trade tracking loophole still in use by Nick Leeson, he hides the losses from the failed trades in an error account, 88888. Nick Leeson also concealed documents from the bank’s auditor and continued to trade with losses accumulating over time. By the beginning of 1995, these losses reached £210 million, which represented half of Barings’ capital.

Eager to wipe out these very large losses, on the evening of January 16, 1995 Nick made a colossal trade – $7 billion – betting that the Nikkei would not fall overnight. Normally this would be considered a low-risk trade, but on the evening of 16 January an earthquake struck Kobe. On the morning of January 17, the Nikkei price collapsed and so did the trader’s positions.

Nick Leeson tried to make up for it by trying to make a quick recovery in the Nikkei, but this did not happen. Nick’s losses reach an abysmal $1.4 billion, which is twice the bank’s capital. Despite Nick’s ability to circumvent the bank’s internal controls, the level of losses is such that his entire scheme is uncovered. And the bank, faced with such losses, is forced to declare bankruptcy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it was a major error in the compliance system that caused the Barings bankruptcy. Nowadays, enforcers can no longer supervise the tasks entrusted to them, and this is all the more true in banks where brand new departments have been created since the 2000s with the rise of compliance and banking regulation.

Useful resources

Mousli M. (2015) Quand un trader fait sauter une banque : Nick Leeson et la Barings L’Économie politique 68(4) 89-101.

Comprehensive history of the Barings bank

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About the author

The article was written in March 2022 by Louis DETALLE (ESSEC Business School, Grande Ecole Program – Master in Management, 2020-2023).

Quick review on the most famous trading frauds ever…

Louis DETALLE

In this article, Louis DETALLE (ESSEC Business School, Grande Ecole Program – Master in Management, 2020-2023) reviews on the most famous trading frauds ever…

Jerôme Kerviel and Société Générale

In 2008, the French bank Société Générale announced having been defrauded by one of its traders, Jérôme Kerviel whom you might have heard about. This fraud cost Société Générale € 4,9 billion and Jérôme Kerviel was accused by the bank of having held positions up to € 50 billion on financial markets without permission. Jérôme Kerviel, on the other hand, accused the bank of having known about his practices since the beginning and of confronting him about them only because he had lost a lot of money. As a consequence, Société Générale’s share lost nearly half his value when the issue was brought to light and the trial is still ongoing…

JP Morgan and Bruno Iksil: The whale

Bruno Iksil joined JP Morgan Chase in 2005 after a short time at Natixis. This French trader got his nickname because of his risky multi-million-dollar bets on credit default swaps (CDS), insurance contracts designed to protect against a country or company default.

In April 2012, the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg were alerted by brokers on “huge” and “very risky” positions taken in the credit market. A trader had bet on the good health of American companies and sold, in very large quantities (several tens of billions of dollars), insurance contracts to cover themselves against their bankruptcy.

His bets were all the riskier since the US economy was showing major signs of slowdown. Other investors and banks, attracted by this opportunity, did not hesitate to take Iksil on, which quickly created an untenable situation for JP Morgan. The losses generated by the “whale” positions amounted to 6.2 billion dollars for JP Morgan.

As a result, the bank’s quarterly results were down by 660 million dollars, while its share price fell by 20% on the New York Stock Exchange.

Nick Leeson & the Barings Bank

Nick Leeson was a 28-year-old trader who had made a name for himself at Barings, England’s oldest investment bank. He became the head of the bank’s Singapore subsidiary by making high-risk, speculative bets. Nick Leeson took advantage of a loophole in the bank’s trading system to conceal his financial activities.

Unfortunately, Nick Leeson’s luck ran out and he suffered huge losses. Nick Leeson took advantage of a loophole in the bank’s trading records to hide his losses. With each trade, Nick Leeson hoped to mop up the previous losses to the point of no return. One evening, Leeson placed a trade betting that the Nikkei exchange rate would remain stable overnight. This seemingly low-risk trade turned out to be a disaster as an earthquake in Kobe caused the Nikkei and all Asian markets to collapse.

As a result of the massive losses, management realized that Leeson had been hiding a lot of money, and Barings, which had lost more than a billion dollars, more than twice its capital, went bankrupt.

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About the author

The article was written in February 2022 by Louis DETALLE (ESSEC Business School, Grande Ecole Program – Master in Management, 2020-2023).

Quick review of the most famous investments frauds ever…

Quick review of the most famous investments frauds ever…

Louis DETALLE

In this article, Louis DETALLE (ESSEC Business School, Grande Ecole Program – Master in Management, 2020-2023) explains what a tax specialist works on, on a daily basis.

The most famous amongst all frauds ever: Charles Ponzi

Born in 1882, this Italian man has built himself quite a reputation in the fraud industry due to his invention: the Ponzi Pyramid. That consisted of a financial business plan that promised a 50% interest rate within 45 days to the investors that picked his solution. You may wonder how it was possible to reach such rates, well it was possible because Charles Ponzi reimbursed the old investors their initial investment plus the interests with the money collected from newer investors and so on… In fact, Ponzi developed an idea that he encountered in the “Banca Zarossi” in Montreal, that relied on a similar principle that made it impossible to reimburse all the clients if they came altogether asking for their savings.

At the end of his fraud, in 1919, Charles Ponzi had managed to convince nearly 40 000 investors to commit to his business plan for $15 million which account for several dozens of current billion dollars. To this day, Ponzi is still considered the father of financial fraud and several others drew from his example.

The Great Bernard Madoff

Bernard Madoff was a New York hedge fund manager who promised the most experienced investors his hedge fund would provide a 7% annual growth whatever the economic conjuncture. His fund relied on the same principle as the Ponzi system that Bernard Madoff hid successfully thanks to his fame in the finance sector. In fact, his renown made all this fraud possible and explains how institutions such as HSBC, Santander, BNP Paribas or Nomura got played. In 2008, when the trick was no longer viable, a 65 billion dollar fraud was unveiled…

The unviable mechanism behind this type of fraud: the Ponzi pyramid

A Ponzi pyramid is a fraudulent financial scheme that enables its creator to offer investors unusually high rates for very limited risk. The offer may seduce lots of investors which will only see their money back if newer investors contribute later. The scam is named after its inventor, Charles Ponzi, has been repeated several times.

However, it must be stated that a Ponzi scheme cannot last… Indeed, let’s consider the following example: Investor A invests 10 euros. The fraud promises to pay back twice as much two months later. Two months later, the company approaches new investors with the same promise. Investors B & C invest 10 euros. Their money is used to pay back the 20 euros promised to Customer A and so on…

In the example, for each round of new investors which corresponds to the maturity of the round of investments, the fraud must convince twice as many investors to invest as during the last row, in order to multiply the funds by 2 (so that the previous row of investors be reimbursed). In the following example, after 20 rounds of investors, the fraud will have to gather 10 485 760 € in order to reimburse the 19th round of investors. As you can see, the scheme had already exceeded its viable size due to an exponential growth which can only cause the loss of the last round of investors and the dreadful financial consequences that comes with it.

Related posts on the SimTrade blog

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   ▶ Louis DETALLE Wirecard: At the heart of the biggest German financial scandal of the 21st century

About the author

The article was written in February 2022 by Louis DETALLE (ESSEC Business School, Grande Ecole Program – Master in Management, 2020-2023).

Ponzi scheme

Ponzi scheme

Louis Viallard

This article written by Louis Viallard (ESSEC Business School, Master in Management – Economic Tracks, 2020-2022) presents the basics of a fraudulent financial scheme: the Ponzi scheme. The famous and recent Madoff Affaire is used to illustrate this financial fraud.

In the Letter 142 of The Persian Letters, Montesquieu tells us the mythological tale of the son of Aeolus, god of the wind, who decides to travel the world to sell air-filled otters. The French author presents us with his reflections on a new discipline in gestation in the 17th century that already fascinates minds: modern finance. Indeed, Montesquieu’s work was written in 1720, the same year as the bursting of one of the first financial bubbles of our history following a speculation around the Royal Bank and the Mississippi Company in which Montesquieu, a contemporary of the crash, was interested. The example used in The Persian Letters with the metaphor of the wind to qualify financial speculation and certain fraudulent financial mechanisms is perfectly suited to define a sadly famous fraudulent scheme: the Ponzi Scheme.

Money makes money – What is a Ponzi scheme?

A Ponzi scheme is a form of financial fraud in which participants are paid with money invested by subsequent participants, not by actual profits from investments or business activities. Investors are attracted by windfall dividends that are paid by the entry of new investors into the system to pay the first ones and so on.

The organizers of a Ponzi scheme generally attract investors by offering higher returns than any legitimate business can offer. The rate of growth of new inflows must be exponential in order to be able to remunerate members, and the system inevitably breaks down when the need for funds exceeds new inflows. Most participants then lose their investments, even though the first participants – including the founders – can benefit from high returns or exceptional annuities provided that to have withdrawn from the scheme in time.

Fraudsters organizing such schemes often target groups that have something in common, such as ethnicity, religion or profession, in the hope of exploiting their trust. The example of the Rochette Affaire in 1908 illustrates this well. Henri Rochette managed to capture the small provincial savings by relying on the wave of investment in coal mines at the beginning of the 19th century and by selling the merits of his (fictitious) companies through investment advice journals that he himself controlled.

An example of a Ponzi Scheme – The Madoff scandal

Bernard Madoff was born in 1938. This American broker immersed himself in finance at a very young age and quickly earned a good reputation among the greatest financiers. Reputed to be intuitive, ultra-fast but also very “ethical”, he had finally established himself in the financial community, which earned him the position of President of Nasdaq from 1990 to 1991. Socially-minded, jovial, he managed to capture the confidence of his future clients.

Through his fund (Bernard Madoff Investment Securities), Mr. Madoff received capital to manage, which he supposedly invested in a complex investing technique: the split-strike conversion strategy (see Bernard and Boyle (2009)). It is a three-step technique. First, you buy a portfolio of securities (the S&P100 index in the case of the Madoff). Second, you purchase out of the money put options with a nominal value on the underlying asset equal to the value of your portfolio. The objective is to limit the risk of loss of the portfolio. Third, you write out of the money call options on the underlying asset with a nominal value equal to the value of your portfolio. The sale of calls finances the purchase of puts.

When the performance was not there, instead of reducing the return distributed to investors, Madoff simply took the money from the new investors and used it to pay the old ones. As a result, he gave the impression of an exceptional performance in terms of risk-return trade-off (relatively high performance but delivered regularly year after year). Such an investment track record allowed Mr Madoff to attract more and more investors, but year after year, he squandered the capital they had entrusted to him.

When the stock market crisis broke out in 2008, many investors wanted to withdraw their funds from Madoff investment. Too many at the same time. Mr. Madoff could not give their money back. He informed his son of the situation and he warned the authorities. On December 11th 2008, Bernard Madoff was arrested by the FBI and was then sentenced to 150 years in prison.

Economic and financial damage

Ponzi schemes are expensive for most participants and divert savings from productive investment. If left unchecked, they can grow disproportionately and cause great economic and institutional damage, undermining confidence in financial institutions and regulators and putting pressure on the budget in the event of bailouts. Their collapse can even lead to economic and social instability.

In the case of a Ponzi Scheme detected, there is a need for a rapid government response. However, the authorities often struggle with not only detecting these scams at an early stage but also put an end to it. There are several reasons why it is difficult to stop these practices. Often, neither the leaders nor the schemes are licensed or regulated. In many countries, supervisory authorities do not have appropriate enforcement tools, such as the right to freeze assets and block systems quickly. On the one hand, once a Ponzi scheme has grown, authorities may be reluctant to stop it, because if they do so – thus preventing it from meeting its repayment obligations – subscribers may blame them rather than the inherent flaws in the system. It is not uncommon to see investors supporting the authors of these chains, trusting them blindly. But on the other hand, when the system collapses of its own accord, experience shows that the authorities can be criticized for not acting more quickly.

“Trust does not preclude control” – The necessity to regulate

To prevent Ponzi schemes, authorities must be prepared to intervene on several fronts. Here are the main ideas when it comes to fight Ponzi schemes:

Investigate. Ponzi schemes are generally difficult to detect due to their opaque or even secretive operation, as members are required to maintain confidentiality. In order to detect them, regulators need to develop effective and sophisticated ways to identify this type of fraud. New technologies can provide an answer through an automatic analysis model that identifies (legal) pyramid schemes that would require further analysis.

Intervene urgently. The procedures required for the prosecution of a person alleged to be the perpetrator of a Ponzi scheme are very lengthy. So much time is left for the perpetrator to disappear. It is necessary to have the legal possibility to immediately stop any activity that is proven to be a Ponzi scheme (freezing of assets, protection of spyware interests, etc.).

Arrest. Heavy penalties must be imposed on crooks, including criminal action (as was the case for Bernard Madoff, who was sentenced to 150 years in prison).

Coordinate and cooperate. It is necessary that the financial authorities must collaborate with the legal system to penalize and regularize. To combat scams, financial regulators need effective mechanisms for information exchange and cooperation. To achieve this, the role of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is central to the articulation of global standards.

Inform. Financial training can be a barrier to scams. It is also essential for financial regulators to inform and educate the public about the main methods used to deceive savers. In the name and shame concept, creating lists of persons or organizations that may or may not be licensed to engage in financial activities, as well as a database describing the actions taken against certain persons and entities, is also a good way to counter any malicious activity.

What lessons can be learned?

Many lessons can be learned from Ponzi schemes, both at the micro and macro levels.

At the micro level, it is important to remind individual investors that the analysis of an investment is essential and must follow three precise criteria: profitability, risk and liquidity (not to be neglected). It is also very wise to follow the adage “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”; portfolio diversification allows you to benefit from the “portfolio effect” due to low statistical correlation among assets.

At the macro level, it is essential for the regulator (like the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US or the Autorité des Marchés financiers (AMF) in France) to put in place tools to monitor and prevent Ponzi schemes, and to work in collaboration with the legal institutions to dissuade and to punish this type of behavior.

Useful resources

Ponzi schemes

Frankel T. (2012) The Ponzi Scheme Puzzle: A History and Analysis of Con Artists and Victims” Oxford, University Press.

Monroe H., A. Carvajal and C. Pattillo (2010) “Perils of Ponzis” Finance & development , 47(1).

Madoff’s scandal (2008)

Bernard C. and P.P. Boyle (2009) “Mr. Madoff’s Amazing Returns: An Analysis of the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy” The Journal of Derivatives, 17(1): 62-76.

Bernard Madoff’s vision about business (video)

Testimonials by Markopolos (video)

Markopolos Talks About Offering To Go Undercover To Stop Madoff (video)

Wetmann A. (2009) L’affaire Madoff, Pion.

The Rochette Affaire (1908)

Jeannenay J.-N. (1981) L’Argent caché : milieux d’affaires et pouvoirs politiques dans la France du XXe siècle Paris, Editions du Seuil.

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About the author

Article written by Louis Viallard (ESSEC Business School, Master in Management – Economic Tracks, 2020-2022).